Angela Johnson v. Scott Wilson, Tiffany Wilson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Angela Johnson v. Scott Wilson, Tiffany Wilson :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael F. Leavitt; Durham Jones and Pinegar; Attorneys for Appellees.
Sean A. Monson, Andrew V. Collins; Bennett, Tueller, Johnson and Deere; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Angela Johnson v. Scott Wilson, Tiffany Wilson, No. 20090193 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1554
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual, ; 
Defendant/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and ; 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, ; 
Plaintiffs/Appellees. ) 
) Case No. £0090193 
) District Churt Case No. 070500581 
) Judge James L. Shumate 
1 . 
* * * * * & 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Fifth District Court 
Washington County 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
Michael F. Leavitt (9476) Sean A. Monson (7261) 
Durham Jones & Pinegar Andrew y. Collins (11544) 
192 East 200 North, 3rd Floor Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere 
St. George, Utah 84771 Millrock Park West Building 
Attorneys for Appellees 3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
UN IIU ill HI i <i i l : l Ol \PPEALS 
•k k k A* * *A* k 
ANGELA JOHNSON; an individual, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
v s, 
SCOT': \\ IL.Vv' ,. an nuln hiuaL anu 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, 
Case No. £0090193 
District Court Case No. 070500^ 
Imige James I.. Shumate 
Tlaiiitil Is/Appellees. 
* V 
* * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Fiiih District ; t 
Washington (\mw 
..: Honorable James J Shumate 
Mieliaci \ \ : '* (>) 
Durham Jon 
192 East 20i 
St. George. Utah 84771 
A ttorneys for Appellees 
Sean A. Monson (7261) 
Andnv, Y. Collins (11544) 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere 
Millrock Park West Building 
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorneys for Appellant 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING BELOW 
The caption contains the names of all parties to the proceeding below. 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENT^ 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING BELOW i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS , ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SFA 1 WAS 
BINDING ON JOHNSON SINCE IT WAS NEVEJl ACCEPTED BY 
JOHNSON 11 
A. Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 Required by Its 
Express Terms 11 
B. The Wilsons' Conduct Demonstrates That They Understood 
that SFA 1 Had Lapsed and That the Parties Had Not Reached 
an Agreement Regarding Seller Financing. 12 
C. Enforcement of SFA 1 Would Violate the Statute of Frauds and 
Fail to Give Effect to the REPC's Provisions Regarding 
Amendment I 13 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THXT THE WILSONS 
DID NOT BREACH THE REPC SINCE THE WILSONS FAILED TO 
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS OR PROVIDE THE CONSIDERATION 
REQUIRED BY SFA 1 | 16 
u 
A. The Wilsons Breached the REPC and SFA 1 By Failing to 
Execute a Promissory Note and Trust Deed in the Amount of 
$990,000.00 16 
B. The REPC and SFA 1 Do Not Provide for Ninety Percent 
Seller Financing 17 
CONCLUSION 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21 
ADDENDUM 22 
A. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 
C. Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders Trust, 1999 UT App 159 
(unpublished) 
D. Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UT App 252 (unpublished) 
E. Real Estate Purchase Contract (R. 24-29, 111-16) 
F. Seller Financing Addendum 1 (R. 118-19) 
G. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R. 583-89) 
H. Final Order and Judgment (R. 603-07) 
Hi 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d411, 414 (Ut£h 1998) 17 
Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UTApp. 252 19 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 
(UtahApp. 1993) 1 12 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. P.J. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) 14 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50 15 
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 9^6 (Utah 2009) 1 
Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Utah 1972) , 17 
Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders Trust, 1999 UTApp 159 < 12 
Reedv. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) 18, 19 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d421, 423-24 (Utah 1986) » 13, 14 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 , 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 , 13-14 
iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue No. 1, Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
proposed Seller Financing Addendum No. 1 ("SFA 1") to the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the "REPC") between Johnson and the Wilsons was valid and enforceable 
when it had not been executed, in writing, by Johnson or delivered to the Wilsons, by 
Johnson, as required by the terms of SFA 1? 
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary 
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. 
Sterling Wentworth Corp,, 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009). 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment, 
the District Court ruled that the REPC was a valid and enforceable agreement. (R. 605.) 
Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 
610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. 
(R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's 
Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District Court entered the 
March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson 
filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
2. Issue No. 2. Assuming that SFA 1 was binding on the parties, did 
the District Court err in concluding that the Wilsons were not in breach of SFA 1, thereby 
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excusing further performance by Johnson under the REP(t, when the Wilsons failed, by 
the time set for closing, to execute a promissory note and )xust deed for seller financing 
consistent with the terms of SFA 1 ? 
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary 
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. 
Sterling Wentworth Corp,, 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah| 2009) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In \\s Final Order and Judgment, 
the District Court ruled that the Wilsons fully performed th^ir obligations stated in the 
REPC and that Johnson breached the REPC. (R. 605.) Johiison filed her initial Notice of 
Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 610-12.)! On March 3, 2009, the 
Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 61^-14.) The Court entered an 
Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's Fees and Cjosts on March 6, 2009. (R. 
633-34.) After the District Court entered the March 6, 2009|order granting Wilson's 
request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on 
April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAt PROVISIONS 
The statutes of central importance to this appeal, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 
-3, are set out verbatim in Addendum A and Addendum B. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs, Scott and Tiffany Wilson (the "Wilsons") filed their Complaint 
against Defendant Angela Johnson ("Johnson") on March 19, 2007, alleging that Johnson 
had breached the terms of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "REPC") to sell real 
property located in St. George, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-7.) The District Court 
entered an interim order, the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, on August 11, 
2008 in favor of the Wilsons finding that an unsigned seller financing addendum was 
binding on Johnson. (R. 583-89.) The District Court then entered a Final Order and 
Judgment on January 21, 2009 in favor of the Wilsons, granting a second motion for 
summary judgment filed by the Wilsons, and finding that Johnson had breached the terms 
of the seller financing addendum and REPC by not conveying the Property to the 
Wilsons. (R. 603-07.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, 
within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment 
to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District 
Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and 
costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Angela Johnson, ("Johnson") is the owner of property located at 704 South 
Anasazi Circle, Washington, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 584.) 
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Johnson listed the Property for sale on or (about December 1, 2006. The 
Multiple Listing Service listing for the Property stated ah asking price of $1,300,000.00 
and stated that "Owner finance available at 30 yr fixed 4|.9% interest. Call listing agent 
regarding terms." (R. 102-03.) 
3. On or about January 6, 2007, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson (the 
"Wilsons") offered to purchase the Property from Johnson, offering to pay $1,100,000 
with the Wilsons paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of 
f$TO0TOOO down knd Johnson seller-financing $990,000. (R. 584.) 
4. The Wilsons' offer (the "REPC") was made on a standard Real Estate 
Purchase Contract form approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. (R. 584.) 
5. The initial offer specified that the purchase price would be paid through 
seller financing and contained the following language: 
There [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing additional 
terms. If there are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated 
into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum No.l [X] Seller 
Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption 
Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in 
some transactions this disclosure is required by Law) [ ] Lead-Based 
Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by 
Law) [X] Other (specify) Notice of Interest Addendum. 
(R. 584.) 
6. Section 3 of the REPC provides as follows: 
"Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or 
to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, . . . (b) 
any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for 
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the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to 
the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. 
(R. 25, 312.) 
7. Section 14 of the REPC offered by the Wilsons on January 8, 2007, 
provides as follows: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of 
the parties.55 (R. 27,314.) 
8. Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: "' Acceptance5 occurs when 
Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or 
counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party 
or to the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.55 
(R. 28, 315.) 
9. Along with the REPC the Wilsons included a seller financing addendum 
("SFA l55) that specified that Johnson would provide seller financing for the Property. (R. 
31-32,584.) 
10. Every addendum to the REPC, including SFA 1, contains the following 
provision: "[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time 
on (Date), to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING 
ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so 
accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM shall lapse.55 
(R. 309.) 
5* 
11. SFA 1 provided, among other things, thkt $990,000.00 of the purchase 
price would be financed by Johnson at a rate of 4.9% with monthly payments of 
$5,250.00 per month beginning on May 1, 2007. SFA 1 (iad an offer expiration deadline 
of 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
12. On or about January 8, 2007, Johnson executed a counteroffer, listed as 
Addendum No. 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000.00 for the purchase of the Properly and 
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house q>n the market." (R. 585.) 
13. Addendum No. 2 specifically states: 
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify! or conflict with any 
provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all 
prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by thip ADDENDUM 
shall remain the same. 
(R. 585.) 
14. Johnson's counteroffer made no mention of S^A 1, and made no changes to 
any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 12 above. (R. 585.) 
15. On that same date, the Wilsons executed Addendum No. 3, counter-
offering the following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (p) in lieu of 72 hour clause, 
settlement to be 2-23-07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be 
to seller on 2-10-07; and (d) all other terms and conditions to 
non-refundable and released 
remain the same. (R. 585.) 
16. On the same date, Johnson signed both the REFjC and Addendum No. 3, but 
did not sign SFA 1. (R. 585.) 
6 
17. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 1 nor did she sign SFA 
1. Neither Johnson nor her agent expressed to the Wilsons or their agent consent to SFA 
1 or its terms. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
18. Nearly one month after the REPC and Addendum No. 3 were signed by 
Johnson, on February 8, 2007, Johnson received a second proposed Seller Financing 
Addendum from the Wilsons ("SFA 2"). SFA 2 did not specify the amount of seller 
financing but offered the same interest rate as SFA 1 and listed the monthly payment as 
$5,250.00 per month. However, SFA 2 then specified the monthly payment amount as 
"P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for principle [sic] and interest 
breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 per month. 2 Months taxed 
[sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." Again, the proposed terms were 
not satisfactory to Johnson. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 2 nor 
did she sign SFA 2 or communicate acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent. 
(R. 104, 322-23.) 
19. On or about February 10, 2007, Johnson received the $20,000 earnest 
money deposit check and negotiated it. (R. 586.) 
20. The Settlement Deadline for the Wilsons' purchase of the Property was 
February 23, 2007, pursuant to Addendum No. 3. (R. 104, 320.) 
21. On or about February 23, 2007, at approximately 12:00 p.m. Johnson hand-
delivered a proposed Seller Financing Addendum to the closing office, Atlas Title, on 
terms acceptable to Johnson at the reduced purchase price of $1,150,000.00, for 
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execution by the Wilsons ("SFA 3")- SFA 3 had an offer acceptance date of February 23, 
2007 at 5:00 p.m. Johnson never received an executed cpopy of SFA 3 from the Wilsons 
or their agent. (R. 104,325-26.) 
22. In spite of the changes in the ultimate pric^ from the Wilsons' initial offer 
to the final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or SFA 1, 
which stated that Johnson would finance $990,000 as the seller and that the Wilsons 
would pay a total of $110,000 as a down payment. (R. 585.) 
23. By close of business on February 23, 2007, the date set for closing, the 
Wilsons tendered a total of $118,625.42 (calculated as the earnest money deposit of 
$20,000.00 delivered to Johnson on or before Februaiy 10, 2007, plus $98,625.42 
delivered to the closing office on February 23, 2007) and a promissory note and trust 
deed for seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000 00. The HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement which the Wilsons executed and delivered to the closing office provided for 
seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000. (R. 334, 255456, 258.) 
24. None of the REPC, SFA 1, SFA 2, or SFA 3 brovide for seller financing in 
the amount of $1,035,000.00. Neither Johnson nor her agent, Meri Crandall, agreed to or 
communicated agreement to that amount of seller financing to the Wilsons, Mr. Larkin, 
or the closing office. (R. 334, 274.) 
25. On February 23, 2007, Johnson went to the title company and signed most 
of the closing documents, but did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement showing 
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seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the transaction did not close. (R. 
604.) 
26. At no time did Johnson or the Wilsons provide the closing office with a 
document signed by all the parties which provides for seller financing in the amount of 
$1,035,000.00. (R.255.) 
27. Following the settlement deadline of February 23, 2007, Wilsons withdrew 
the sum of $98,625.42 from the closing office. (R. 256.) 
28. On February 26, 2007 (three days after the settlement deadline had 
expired), the Wilsons caused a Notice of Interest in Real Property (the "NOP) to be 
recorded against the Property in the official records of Washington County, Utah. (R. 
328, 334.) 
29. Nowhere in the Wilsons' initial offer, any other documents signed by the 
parties or even in the unexecuted SFA 1 and SFA 2 is there any reference nor did the 
parties ever discuss or agree to seller financing of a specific percentage of the total 
purchase price (90% or otherwise). (R. 103-04, 110-19, 123-26.) 
30. According to the custom and practice of the Utah residential real estate 
industry, both parties to a standardized REPC must execute and accept an addendum to 
the REPC in order for the terms of the addendum to be included in the purchase and sale 
transaction. This requirement of dual execution and mutual acceptance enables an 
escrow officer and real estate agent to know which addenda represent the agreement of 
the parties and are to be included in the closing. (R. 445, 448.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in ruling that SFA 1 was tending on Johnson since 
Johnson did not accept SFA 1 in accordance with its stated terms. In order to accept SFA 
1, thereby making it binding on both Johnson and the Wilsons, Johnson was required to 
sign SFA 1 and communicate to the Wilsons that SFA 1 had been accepted. Johnson did 
neither. By its own express terms, the Wilsons offer for seller financing, on the terms set 
forth in SFA 1, lapsed when it was not accepted by Johnson. 
Assuming SFA 1 was enforceable against Johnson, the Wilsons breached its 
terms. SFA 1 provided for seller financing in the amount of $990,000.00. The Wilsons 
never executed a promissory note or trust deed or other seller financing document in the 
amount of $990,000.00. Instead, at closing, the Wilsons tendered seller financing 
documents in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and insisted Johjnson close. Johnson never 
agreed to seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the Wilsons, not Johnson, 
breached the terms of the REPC and SFA 1. The Wilsons' 
performance from Johnson. 
breach excused any further 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SFA 1 WAS 
BINDING ON JOHNSON SINCE IT WAS NEVER ACCEPTED BY 
JOHNSON, 
A. Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 as Required by Its Express 
Terms. 
In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered August 11, 2008, the 
Court concluded that SFA 1, which was offered to Johnson by the Wilsons in conjunction 
with the REPC, was binding upon Johnson even though she never signed SFA 1 nor 
communicated her assent. (R. 586-87.) The Wilsons set a deadline for SFA 1 to be 
accepted by 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 309.) SFA 1 stated that it could only be 
accepted by Johnson "in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC" and 
that "[ujnless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse." (R. 
309) (emphasis added). Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: 
"Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer 
of the other: (a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate 
acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's 
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
(R. 315) (emphasis added). At no time did Johnson sign SFA 1, nor did she or her agent 
communicate to the Wilsons or their agent that SFA 1 had been signed or that Johnson 
had accepted the terms of SFA 1. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
SFA 1 constituted an offer and the manner of acceptance of the offer was clearly 
described by its express terms. "When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be 
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner. Otherwise mutual assent is 
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lacking, and no contract is formed." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. David 
E. Ross II, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993); see also Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders 
Trust, 1999 UT App 159, *2 ("[W]hen the terms of a contract provide for the method of 
acceptance, acceptance can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed 
method") (unpublished opinion). Johnson failed TO sign SFA 1 or otherwise 
communicate her acceptance of its terms to the Wilson^ 
January 8, 2007 (the offer acceptance deadline chosen 
SFA 1 lapsed and did not become part of the REPC wh^n Johnson accepted Addendum 
or their agent by 5:00 p.m. on 
by the Wilsons). Accordingly, 
No. 3. 
B. The Wilsons' Conduct Demonstrates Thatl They Understood that SFA 1 
Had Lapsed and That the Parties Had | Not Reached an Agreement 
Regarding Seller Financing. 
The Wilsons' conduct after the lapse of SFA 1 demonstrates that they understood 
that SFA 1 had lapsed and was not part of the REPC. Onj 
sent to Johnson a second Seller Financing Addendum, SFA 2, which did not specify the 
February 8, 2007, the Wilsons 
amount of seller financing and which detailed a different 
SFA 1. (R. 104, 322-23.) Where SFA 1 simply stated thai 
(monthly payment amount than 
payments would be $5,250.00 
per month, SFA 2 stated "P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for 
principle [sic] and interest breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 
per month. 2 Months taxed [sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." (R. 
322.) Further, SFA 1 required the Wilsons to deliver the following to Johnson or the 
closing office by the close of business on February 23, 200y: (a) a promissory note in the 
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amount of $990,000.00 and (b) the sum of $160,000.00 (representing the difference 
between the total purchase price and the portion of the purchase price to be seller 
financed pursuant to the amounts set forth in SFA 1). (R. 308, 320.) The Wilsons did not 
deliver the required funds and documents by February 23, 2007; instead they delivered 
$118,625.42 ($20,000.00 in earnest money plus $98,625.42 at closing on February 23, 
2007) and a promissory note in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 334, 256, 586.) The 
Wilsons' own conduct—which is entirely inconsistent with the stated terms of SFA 1— 
demonstrates that SFA 1 was not agreed to by the parties and was not incorporated into 
the REPC. 
C. Enforcement of SFA 1 Would Violate the Statute of Frauds and Fail to 
Give Effect to the REPC's Provisions Regarding Amendment. 
The REPC is within the Utah Statute of Frauds. "[A]n offer to purchase [real 
estate] when accepted creates an interest in real estate and is within the statute of frauds." 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Utah 1986). Section 25-5-1 of Utah Code 
Annotated (Sections 25-5-1 et seq. referred to as the "Utah Statute of Frauds") provides 
in relevant part: 
No estate or interest in real property,. . . shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same. 
Section 25-5-3 of Utah Code Annotated further provides in relevant part: "Every 
contract . . . for the sale, of any lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
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whom the lease or sale is to be made." The Utah Supreme Court stated in Golden Key 
Realty, Inc. v. PJ. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) that "[t]he rule is well settled 
in Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the 
requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." 
including SFA 1, represents a subsequent agreement which modifies the REPC. 
Each addendum to the REPC, 
The express terms of the REPC are consistent w 
Section 14 of the REPC states: "This Contract cannot 
th the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
be changed except by written 
agreement of the parties." (R. 314.) As mentioned above, each addendum to the REPC 
requires the offeree to accept the offer/addendum by signing the addendum and 
transmitting her acceptance of the same to the offeror. The terms of the REPC cannot be 
modified or added upon except through a subsequent written agreement signed by the 
parties. 
In Williams, the seller under a real estate purchasb contract failed to accept an 
offer to purchase property owned by her and her husband as joint tenants by the offer 
acceptance deadline set by the buyer. The seller later attempted to ratify her husband's 
timely acceptance of the offer. The Utah Supreme Court held that the seller's attempt to 
accept the offer (or ratify her husband's prior acceptance) after the offer had lapsed was 
ineffectual. Id. at 424. The Court stated that the sel 
ratification . . . would play havoc with the laws of offer and Acceptance." Id, 
er's theory of "open-ended 
14 
Likewise, the Wilsons' argument, and the District Court's ruling, that a party to a 
real estate purchase contract can be bound to the terms of an addendum which she has not 
signed in accordance with the terms of the addendum would "play havoc" with the laws 
of offer and acceptance in the context of residential real estate purchases. Under the 
Wilsons' theory of the law, parties to a residential real estate purchase contract, their 
agents, and closing offices would be uncertain as to which addenda were binding and 
which were not. While the Wilsons' position would lead to chaos, the express terms of 
the REPC and addenda and relevant Utah statutory and case law lend themselves to 
clarity, consistency, and the mutual assent of the parties. 
Finally, "[a] court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 'harmonize and 
give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f^ 
30, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). To adopt the Wilsons' position and affirm the 
District Court's ruling would be to render superfluous the provisions in each addendum 
which require acceptance by a certain deadline and in accordance with the "acceptance" 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. It would also render superfluous Section 14 of the 
REPC, requiring amendments to be in writing. Finally, it would render the acceptance, 
rejection, and counter-offer provision and signature block on each addendum superfluous, 
since the offeree could be bound by the terms of the addendum without ever signing it. 
In sum, the District Court erred in finding that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WILSONS 
DID NOT BREACH THE REPC SINCE THE WILSONS FAILED TO 
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS OR PROVIDE J HE CONSIDERATION 
REQUIRED BY SFA 1. 
A. The Wilsons Breached the REPC and jSFA 1 By Failing to Execute a 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed in the Amount of $990,000.00 
Johnson did not breach the terms of the REPC when she refused to sign the HUD-
1 Settlement Statement on February 23, 2007. The REPC provided for seller financing in 
the amount for $990,000.00. (R. 585.) Likewise, SFA 1 
to be binding on Johnson even though she did not sign it 
which the District Court found 
or deliver it to Wilsons, clearly 
stated that the amount for seller financing was $990,000.00. (R. 585.) The Wilsons have 
not produced any document signed by the parties which states a different amount of seller 
financing or any other agreement executed by Johnson recognizing a different amount of 
seller financing. Therefore, the REPC and SFA 1, assuming it was binding on the parties, 
required the Wilsons, as buyers, to tender a promissory nob and trust deed in the amount 
of $990,000.00 and cash in the amount of $140,000.00 (Calculated as the total purchase 
price of $1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20j000.00, less seller financing in 
the amount of $990,000.00) to Johnson or the closing office by close of business on 
February 23, 2007. Instead, the Wilsons tendered $98 625.42 in cash along with a 
promissory note and trust deed in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 586.) Johnson never 
agreed to seller financing in this amount. It is the Wilsons who breached the terms of the 
REPC and SFA 1, not Johnson. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,414 
(Utah 1998) stated the well established rule that: 
When one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material failure' in 
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty 
to continue to perform under the contract. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 237 (1981). This general rule is based on the principle that 
where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, 
each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called upon to 
perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the expected 
exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of 
performance by the other party. 
Likewise, in Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Utah 1972), the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that: 
The law regarding the rights under a contract of one who first breaches it is 
set out in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 365, as follows: As a rule, a party first 
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the 
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on 
performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other 
party for a subsequent failure to perform. . . . It has also been said that 
where a contract is not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach 
is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the 
nonperformance. 
The Wilsons' failure to tender the agreed upon amount of cash and a promissory note for 
the required amount of seller financing constituted a material breach or failure to perform 
under the REPC and excused Johnson from further performance. 
B. The REPC and SFA 1 Do Not Provide for Ninety Percent Seller 
Financing. 
The Wilsons argued below, and the District Court impliedly found, that the 
Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA because the REPC and SFA 1 were intended 
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to provide that Johnson seller finance ninety percent (90°/jo) of the purchase price of the 
Property. (R. 552—53, 586-87.) The only evidence that the Wilsons offered in support of 
this contention was Scott Wilson's unexpressed intent. (R. 356.) Johnson disputed that 
she ever had this intent and the Wilsons themselves do not contend that they ever even 
spoke with Johnson regarding this version of the REPC and SFA 1. There is no 
document agreed to by Johnson or even prepared by Wilsons expressing this intent. The 
REPC and SFA 1 are clear on their face—Johnson is to provide seller financing in the 
amount of $990,000.00. The District Court's wholesale rewrite of the REPC and SFA 1 
is inconsistent with the statute of frauds and should be reversed. Johnson did not breach 
the terms of the REPC or SFA 1. Rather the Wilsons did ip failing to tender the proper 
amounts. 
At its core, the Wilsons' contention is that the $50,d00.00 gap between the 
purchase price initially offered by the Wilsons ($1,100,000.00) and the purchase price 
ultimately agreed to ($1,150,000.00), which is not addressed in any of the documentation 
surrounding this transaction, should be absorbed by Johnson as part of "seller financing." 
This contention, which was accepted by the District Court, is inconsistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). In Reed, the 
Utah Supreme Court, while interpreting a contract for the purchase of real property for 
$70,000.00 upon "terms to be arranged," stated that "[w]here there is no agreement 
concerning the terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of 
the contract by requiring full payment at the time of the tenqer of the conveyance." Id. at 
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1378-79 (emphasis added). This principle has subsequently been relied on and applied 
by the Utah Court of Appeals: "More troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the 
seller financing in the agreement. However, such uncertainty does not invalidate a 
contract. Rather, a requirement of full cash payment at closing will be implied" Dunn v. 
Prichard, 2001 UT App 252, *1 n.l (citing Reed, 610 P.2d at 1378-79) (emphasis added) 
(unpublished opinion). 
In this case, again assuming that SFA 1 is enforceable even though it was never 
"accepted" by Johnson according to SFA 1's own terms, the principles articulated in 
Reed and Dunn, as well as the structure of the REPC1, require the uncertainty regarding 
the allocation of the additional $50,000 to be resolved in Johnson's favor by requiring the 
Wilsons to pay $140,000 in cash at closing (calculated as the total purchase price of 
$1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in the 
amount of $990,000.00). The Wilsons only paid $98,625.42 in cash at closing. (R. 586.) 
Consequently, the Wilsons failed to tender the required cash payment of $140,000 at 
closing and thereby materially breached the REPC. This material breach excused any 
1
 Paragraph 2 of the REPC, which sets forth the purchase price for the subject property, 
specifies the terms of payment in paragraph 2.1 by subtracting each type of payment from 
the total purchase price. (R. 24, 311.) Therefore, from the total purchase price of 
$1,150,000, the REPC first subtracts any earnest money paid. (R. 24, 311.) Then, the 
REPC subtracts any amounts provided by a new loan, the buyer's assumption of an 
existing loan, seller financing, and/or any "other" payment. (R. 24, 311.) Finally, after 
all other methods of payment have been allocated, the "Balance of Purchase Price [is 
due] in Cash at Settlement." (R. 24, 311.) This structure of the REPC supports the 
principle stated in Reed and Dunn because all amounts required for full payment of the 
purchase price not otherwise provided for in the REPC are due in cash at the time of 
closing. 
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obligation Johnson had to convey the Property or to render any further performance 
under the REPC. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's entrt ot summary judgment in favor 
of the Wilsons because it erred in concluding that (i) SFA 
though she never signed it in the manner specified by the REPC for it to be accepted and 
1 was binding on Johnson even 
(ii) the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 when they failed to tender a 
promissory note and trust deed for seller financing in the amounts specified in SFA 1. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
AA 
Andrew V. Collins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (j^ day of October, 2009,1 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via U.S. Mail, 
first-class postage prepaid, on the following: 
Michael F. Leavitt 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
192 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
a^)/C{j^^f 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 
C. Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders Trust, 1999 UT App 159 (unpublished) 
D. Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UT App 252 (unpublished) 
E. Real Estate Purchase Contract (R. 24-29, 111-16) 
F. Seller Financing Addendum 1 (R. 118-19) 
G. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (JR. 583-89) 
H. Final Order and Judgment (R. 603-07) 
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Addendum A 
Page 1 
LEXSTATUC A 25-5-1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. * 
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/200*); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) * 
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CA^ES) * 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2009) 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over 
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created], 
clared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-1. 
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LEXSTAT UCA 25-5-3 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRSt SPECIAL SESSION. * 
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/20W); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) * 
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CA^ES) * 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2009 
§ 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463; C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 ty C. 1943, 33-5-3. 
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^LexisNexis* 
LEXSEE 1999UTAPP 159 
Daniel J. Phelps, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellaiu, v. Jean Smith Sanders 
Trust, Defendant, Appellant, and Crossjappellee. 
Case No. 971575-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
1999 UT App 159; 1999 Utah App. LE^IS 292 
May 13,1999, Filed 
NOTICE: 
CATION 
[*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-
PRIOR HISTORY: Second District, Farmington 
Department. The Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed and remanded. 
COUNSEL: Craig S. Cook and George B. Handy, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Douglas M. Durbano and Stanley L. Ballif, Layton, for 
Appellee 
JUDGES: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding 
Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Nor-
man H. Jackson, Judge 
OPINION BY: Pamela T. Greenwood 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTEROFFER 
Both parties agree that at the June 26, 1995, meeting the 
time for acceptance of plaintiffs offer had lapsed, result-
ing in Sanders's signature on the contract becoming a 
counteroffer. See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 
185, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971) ("An offeror who 
receives an acceptance which is too late or which is oth-
erwise defective, cannot at his election regard it as valid. 
The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer which 
must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order 
to create a contract."). Therefore, the issue is whether 
Phelps accepted Sanders's counteroffer by initialing the 
contract. Whether a contract [*2] exists is question of 
law that we review for correctness. See Hughes & Sons 
Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Sanders correctly argues that when the terms of a con-
tract provide for the method of acceptance, acceptance 
can only be effectuated by compliance with the pre-
scribed method. SeeCrane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 
714 P.2d 3, 4 (btah Ct. App. 1989) ("In making an offer, 
the offeror may specify the manner in which the offer 
must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the spe-
cified manner, mutual assent is lacking and no contract is 
formed."). In this case, the contract required the parties 
to the contract to "sign the offer or counter offer where 
noted to indicate acceptance." (Emphasis added.) The 
contract also included a signature line at the bottom of 
the document. Therefore, we must determine whether 
initialing the contract constituted a signature for purposes 
of accepting the counteroffer. 
In Jaffe v. Gibbons, 290 S.C. 468, 351 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1986), the court addressed the question of 
whether initialing a contract for the sale of real estate 
was tantamount to an acceptance of [*3] a counteroffer 
when the contract required a signature for acceptance. 
See id. at 346. In holding that there was a meeting of the 
minds such that a valid contract was formed, the court 
noted that generally when two parties to a transaction 
both sign a document, that document becomes a valid, 
enforceable contract. See id. at 345. Under circumstances 
similar to this case, the court held that "when [the buyer] 
initialed the [changes to the contract], he accepted the 
counter offer, thereby creating a binding contract." Id. at 
346. Furthermore, the court held that although the buyer 
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"only initialed and did not sign his full name to the dele-
tions; the initials, in our opinion, amount to both a sign-
ing and an acceptance by Jaffe of the counter offer." Id; 
see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 188 (1991) (in-
itialing a contract is as effective in binding a party there-
to as a full signature.) 
In this case, the trial court found, and neither party dis-
putes, that each party understood the terms of the con-
tract and intended to enter into a binding contract. 
Therefore, we conclude that Phelps's signature via his 
initials on the contract [*4] constituted a valid accep-
tance of Sanders's counteroffer. l 
1 We find no merit in Sanders's argument that 
Phelps's signature was not placed in the correct 
location and thus rendered the contract invalid. 
See PIO v. John B. Gilliland Constr., Inc. 276 
Ore. 975, 560 P.2d 247, 250 (Ore. 1976) (holding 
signature placed anywhere on a contract is suffi-
cient to authenticate it). 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Utah's statute of frauds provides that all interests in real 
property "shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or 
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998); see also 
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 33 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" a document to be enforceable 
under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the 
party granting the conveyance"' (emphasis add-
ed)(quoting [*5] Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1986))), petition for cert, filed, 231 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24 (Utah 1994). 
The contract at issue is clearly a sufficient writing me-
morializing the parties' intent to convey real property. 
Furthermore, the contract is signed by Sanders - the 
party conveying the land and the party against whom 
enforcement is sought; therefore, the contract in this case 
satisfies the statute of frauds. 
ATTOFNF.Y FEES 
Phelps argues the trial court erred in refusing to award 
him attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under 
the contract. However, Phelps did not raise the issue of 
attorney fees under the contract either in his complaint or 
motion for summary judgment and thus waived his right 
to attorney fees below. See Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550, 
1999 UT App 126, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding party waived right to attorney fees 
because "attorney fees were never mentioned at oral ar-
gument" and party failed "to properly address the issue to 
the trial courtf'). Nevertheless, Phelps is entitled to rea-
sonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand 
to the trial court for a determination [*6] and award of 
these fees. | 
Finally, Pnelps argues that he should be awarded at-
torney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
because Sanders's defense was in bad faith. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 & Supp. 1998). We disag-
ree. Trial courts are accorded broad discretion in award-
ing attorney fees based on an opposing party's bad faith. 
See Valcarcelv. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 
1997). Because Sanders has failed to show the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees to 
Phelps under section 78-27-56, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of attorney fees on this basis. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Pamela T. 
WE CONCUR: 
Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W Bench, Judge 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
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LEXSEE2001UTAPP252 
Douglas W. Dunn and Ruth E. Dunn, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
Agnes Prichard; Seven Prichard; Jean S. Kump aka Wanda Jean Kump, trustee of 
the Jean S. Kump Trust; and Delbert Keith Kump and Jodi Sue Dembowski, per-
sonal representatives of the Shirl R. Kump Estate, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20000823-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UT^H 
2001 UT App 252; 2001 Utah App. LEklS 412 
August 30, 2001, Filed 
NOTICE: 
CATION 
[*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-
PRIOR HISTORY: Eighth District, Vernal Depart-
ment. The Honorable John R. Anderson 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part; reversed in part 
and remanded. 
COUNSEL: Daniel S. Sam, Vernal, for Appellants 
Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Vernal, for 
Appellees 
JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge, William 
A. Thorne, Jr., Judge 
OPINION BY: Gregory K. Orme 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne. 
ORME, Judge: 
The lack of earnest money, omission of a closing date, 
and identification of other terms as "N.A." do not render 
the contract unenforceable in this case, for essentially the 
reasons argued by appellants. ' Therefore, the trial court 
erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judg-
ment. However, it does not follow that appellants are 
entitled to summary judgment. 
1 Mjore troubling is the lack of any detail con-
cerning the seller financing called for in the 
agreement. However, such uncertainty does not 
invalidate a contract. Rather, a requirement of full 
cash payment at closing will be implied. See Reed 
v. Alvdv, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 1980). 
[*2] In their motion for summary judgment, ap-
pellees contended that appellants led them to believe that 
what they signed was merely a preliminary document 
appellants could use to help determine if financing could 
be obtained and was not intended to be a binding con-
tract for the sale of real estate. Appellants challenge this 
contention factually, but also argue that extrinsic evi-
dence regarding the intention of the parties and their 
discussions leading up to the signing of the document is 
not admissibly to vary the terms of an integrated con-
tract. 
thfe 
held 
While 
have long 
show the 
made or the 
ecuted." Unio\i 
(Utah 1985). 
bos, 607 P.2d| 
evidence was 
notes were 
tabling loans 
tracts); Bybee 
(Utah 1948) [J 
missible to 
was actually 
precept is generally true, Utah courts 
that "parole evidence is admissible to 
circumstances under which the contract was 
(purpose for which the writing was ex-
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 
also Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Mei-
798, 801 (Utah 1980)(indicating parole 
properly admitted to show that signed 
represented as being "just a formality" in ob-
not intended by defendants to be con-
Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122 
3] (explaining parole evidence is ad-
that what appears to be a warranty deed 
onlv for security purposes). 
show 
See • 
and 
given i 
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Particularly insightful is the case of Union Bank v. 
Swenson, where a unanimous Utah Supreme Court held 
that allegations, such as those made by the appellees in 
this case, "raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the parties assented to the writing as a final 
statement of the intended agreement or executed it for 
some other purpose." 707 P.2d at 666. The Union Bank 
Court further explained that "parole evidence, indeed any 
relevant evidence, is admissible" to assist a court in de-
termining whether a writing was intended by the parties 
to be a fully integrated agreement. Id. at 665. 
Thus, appellees' contention in this regard is not fo-
reclosed as a matter of law. The relevant material facts 
are in dispute 
resolved on 
56(c). Accordin 
appellants' sijmmary 
court's grant 
and remand 
may now be £ 
however, meaning the claim cannot be 
(summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
gly, we affirm the trial court's denial of 
judgment motion, reverse the trial 
of appellees' summary judgment motion, 
trial or such other [*4] proceedings as 
ppropriate. 
for 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge 
Addendum E 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is a legally binding contract Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this form, 
delete its provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer S m t t & T i f f a n y W i l s o n . J oners to purchase the Prop 
amount of S 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 in the form of described below and hereoy delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the ; C h e c k which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23), 
shall be deposited in accordance with state law. 
Received by: on 
(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money) 
Brokerage: F x i t R e d R o c k R e a l t y Phone Number 4 3 5 - 9 8 6 - 0 2 2 0 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 . P R O P E R T Y : 7Qd 3 ANASAZI Circ?e Washincton. UT 3^780 
also described as: Indian Oaks Subdivision Lot #24 
Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to alter or 
consult your attorney or tax advisor. 
offers to purchase the Property 
-(Date) 
city of Washington t County of W a s h i n g t o n , State 
1,1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following 
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling 
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and 
window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system 
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as^  
All items outlined ?n MLS profile. !o a(sc include aU fixtures. built-in cabir.ctfr'entef.ginnneot ce^iere. electronic A recreational eQuiomelnt on premtsis 3( stfer cate 'Jha\ r^av or may noi De in :he MLS profile. 
of Utah, Zip 8 4 7 R 0 (the "Property"). 
items if presently owned and attached to 
fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light 
" door screens; storm doors and windows; 
permanently affixed carpets; automatic 
shrubs. The following items shall also be 
to title: 
1.2 Excluded Items, The following items are excluded from this sale: _ 
AH r e m o v a h l e f u r n i t u r e s t i c h as her is , l i nens , f l a t w a r e tatytes & c h a i r s 
1,3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale. 
NA 
2, PURCHASE PRICE The Purchase Price for the Property is $ 1.100.00(8.00 
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
$ 7 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$__ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan i s provided in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans: [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ] VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) 
If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
below and give details: 
s 
s 
S 
s 
990.000.00 
90 000 00 
s i 10000000 
Addendum if applicable) 
if applicable) 
(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption 
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Aqdendum 
(e) Other (specify) 
(f) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) 
2,2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioner]! upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable 
loan(s) referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition." 
(b) [ x ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. 
Section 2.3 does not apply. | > 
Page 1 of 6 pages Seller's Initials Date Buyer's In i t ia lsS)/-^ ' Date l/fc/dl ~7 
2.3 Application for Loan, 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a) Buyer shall 
apply for the Loan "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the 
'Lender") the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and (a) paid all loan application fees as 
required by the Lender Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender j 
(b) Procedure if Loan Application is denied If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
does not approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a 
copy to Seller Buyer or Seller may. within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice cancel this Contract by 
providing written notice to the other party in the event of a cancellation under this Section 2 3(b) (i) if the Notice of Loan 
Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money 
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was rece ved by Buyer after that date, the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Sejler's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2 3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing 
Condition set forth in Section 2 2(a) Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be 
governed by such other provisions I 
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price This condition is referred to as\ the "Appraisal Condition" If the Appraisal 
Condition applies and the Buyer receives wntten notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for less than the 
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such written notice 
to Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice In the event of a cancellation under this 
Section 2 4 (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (n) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by 
Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Sellef, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's 
exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2 4 
shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section 
of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 
Seller agree in writing "Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following 
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all 
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by " 
in the form of collected or cleared funds, and (c) any monies required to be 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of 
shall each pay one-half (YT) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing offici 
process Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on 
Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limbed 
and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement, 
made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f). unless 
Such writing could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered 
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds 
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing 
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding 
four calendar days of Settlement 
Z4(f), or on a date upon which Buyer and 
Have been completed (a) Buyer and Seller 
documents required by this Contract, by the 
Required to be paid by Buyer under these 
' to Seller or to the escrow/closing office 
by Seller under these documents have 
collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer 
for its services in the settlement/closing 
assumed obligations shall be prorated at 
" to, security deposits, cleaning deposits 
Prorations set forth in this Section shall be 
otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties 
' closed when Settlement has been 
of any new loan have been delivered by 
documents have been recorded in the 
sentence shall be completed within 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within [ j 
[ ] Other (specify) 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract 
[ ] Seller's Initials P^Buye r ' s Initials 
The Listing Agent, M F f f l C R A N D A l I , represents [X] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Listing Broker, COLDWELL BANKER PREMIER . represents Jx] Se|ler { ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
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hours [ ] J days after Closing; 
Buyer's I r t i t ia lsr f f i t Date x 
The Selling Agent, J E R E M Y L A R K 1 N represents [ ] Seile 
The Selling Broker. E X I T R E D R O C K R E A L T Y . represents [ ] Sel 
6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard 
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insuranc^ 
(coverage owner's policy of title insurance 
coverage shall be at Buyer's expense 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced 
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated 
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating 
zoning code violations; and 
(e) Other (specify) 
in Section 24(b), Seller shall provide 
Disclosures" 
by Seller; 
to environmental problems and building or 
the 
8, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS 
under this Contract (check applicable boxes): 
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all 
Section 7; 
IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition 
IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property 
IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms an 
coverage for the Property; 
[ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
[X ] IS 
[ ] IS 
[X] IS 
[ 1 
1X1 [ 1 
(e) [X] IS 
Professional Home & Termite Inspection 
Mn 
afe 
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2 
apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations 
through inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & 
24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine 
acceptable to Buyer. 
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections 
this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to 
the Evaluations & inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in whi^h 
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may 
objections, if Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner o^ 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If 
this Section 8 4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiter 
Section 10. 
»Seller 
bU 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms If there are 
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [ J Addendum No 1 
[X ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure te rpemirpH hu io™a r i i ^A D—«^ r>~:_«. is
Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is 
(specify) required 
Notice Of Interest Addendum 
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r [X] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
er [X] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent 
Buyer's obligation to purchase 
Seller Disclosures referenced in 
inspection of the Property; 
' f by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"); 
availability of homeowner's insurance 
and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not 
the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless 
for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
'""'" & Inspections and with the walk-
Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 
if the Evaluations & Inspections are 
Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
ntract by providing written notice to Seller, 
Seller with written notice of objections. 
is Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel 
regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
to agree in writing upon the manner of 
shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
iar days after expiration of the Response 
Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
- shall not affect those items warranted in 
required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
L j
 by law) [ x ] Other 
Buyer's f n i l i a l g ^ t ' Date ///W^O 7 
^ 
*JL'J /-&-D-? 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title tb the Property and will convey good and 
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agreejs, however, to accept title to the Property 
subject to the following matters of record, easements, deed restrictions. CG&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and 
restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer 
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring 
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other 
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2. 
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants 
Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will bq 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal beloihgings 
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense; 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will 
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes; 
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicabl^ permits, and shall be in working order and 
fit. for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in tf^ ie same general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced I 
warranties provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10,2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home 
Warranty Plan [X] WILL [ ] WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be 
ordered by [X] Buyer [ ] Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by [X] Buyer [ ] Seller. The cost of the Home 
Warranty Plan shall not exceed $450.00 and shall be paid for at Settlement byf f 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the 
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") are respectively 
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior 
items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not 
by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of 
the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no chandes 
no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improy 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or h$r 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties, 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior 
(check applicable box) 
[X] SHALL 
[ ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to 
fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall 
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest IVJIoney Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
Page 4 of 6 pages Seller's Initials Date Buyer's \n\t\a)s^^i\J__ Date ////yfi ^~? 
Kc). 
3nts 
in the following condition ON THE DATE 
Any Seller or tenant moving-related 
in this Section 10.3 is separate from the 
[ ] Buyer [X] Seller. 
reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
Property is "as represented," meaning that 
jf present, repaired/changed as agreed, and 
to Settlement, replace, correct or repair the 
' at Settlement to provide for the same. 
$s represented, shall not constitute a waiver 
Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of 
in any existing leases shall be made; (b) 
ements to the Property shall be made or 
rfiade. 
>, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
this Contract cannot be changed except by 
to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
shall be submitted to mediation through a 
tiear its own costs of mediation. If mediation 
apply Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit 
\tf 
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. It Seller defaults, in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees t o — 'u~ r.~..:^^ ^ »~ o 
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is 
2.3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorneyj 
in mediation under Section 15 
pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
not a default and is governed by Section 
to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
fees shall not be awarded for participation 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be" (a) in writing; (b) signed 
by "the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10 2, 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical darrpage 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
or destruction to the Property or its 
caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
2 1 . TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set 
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract 
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PMJ 
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall, be counted beginning on th4 
timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance 
be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to 
in writing by such non-party. 
i this 
of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
the same as delivery of an original. This 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding tcj an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
(a) performance under each Section 
Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b) 
day following the event which triggers the 
<|ates and times referenced herein shall not 
Contract, except as otherwise agreed to 
(a) Loan Appl icat ion & Fee Deadline 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline 
(c) Evaluat ions & Inspections Deadline 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline 
(e) Appra isa l Deadline 
(f) Sett lement Deadline 
NA (Date) 
3 Business Days after Acceptance (Date) 
FphmaryQth. ?D07 
.NA. 
February 9th. ?f)07 
(Date) 
(Date) 
On or before March 9th 
(Date) 
bQD7 (Date) 
25 OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If 
Seller does not accept this offer by: 5 : 0 0 . t ] AM [ x ] PM Mountain Time on J f g n n a r y 8 t h , ? 0 0 7 (Date), 
tbis-qffer shalllapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit io Buyer 
(g t f fe /s Signature) 
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Hfl/UA S\ 
' (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature);' j " 
Seller's Initials Date 
1/k hb-0 
(Offer Date) 
Buyer's Init a l s ^ / g f f i l / Date (///?/fi / 
I I le iat: '•!" >f the a I JOVC Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
StQlfj T/FftftiV k/iL9D^ I'll Piu%kndccJ7f Sh&erfGs. UT ^770 
(Buyers Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
above.,. 
[ ] " '=NrEKOFFER: Seller presents foi Buyei "s Acceptance the teifu', wf Kuy*;j\, uf!«i -;iitipu I tn tht- f»t cptiufr. of 
:u itujns as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. . 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) 
[ ] RE IECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT i.t O H - T 
State law requires Bi oket to i ur nisi i Buyer and Seller wit! » copt r . •. 1 '»•: 
section below.) 
A. . !acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Cont] 
ntract bearing all signatures. (Fill in applicable 
/. MZ (fintr) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signaturi) 
/AM 
'(Date) 
(Date) 
B. I pei sonally caus^u a it,,at copy w. iNe i^uyun.^ . J H . J U I„ , . < .*.. . l ! o 
delivered on (Date), postage
 (MOJ -H! ti.*h(-»( 
Sent/Defivered by (specify) ___ 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.' 
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wxaptabte to Bifyo<v 
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thta Confab a a p w ^ 
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ofywforwi. tf buyer qtN s a w WW* not aped In wtttfcg upon me manner of iwtfwqi Buyrf* ot^dkviK fity* may 
c*c#t?ite Contract by pfyvi^ 
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Stttfenta. 
8, ADDITIONAL TWOS, ThorapQAAt, { J ARIWT *idMi to tffe tfth*f**n&, 
the tare qftftofoflo^o^^ 1 AdOondum Mo, t »
 m 
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undorte^^(d}nolUrttef l^^ 
131AUTHORHY OF SIGNERS, if 8uyar or Salter fo a cwonrion, pfftferaNp, trust, w*», wnfcrt fci% romping or 
o^on%,ttoporean««8cuf^tHoG^ 
14, COMPLETE CCtrmACTf Hi* Comreot to«#fcr%«h to addomfe, try attached eaOifofte, ana <*w<w Dtetosucw, 
condSiitai the «ntte Contrast bdb^en the plrtta aril $upot9#dw and replace* any and dl prior negoddkro, 
r^ prw^ jaiatk>mif w^rar«^ Itlte <3kmteanl caannot .to cJwrnjtd «w»pt l>f 
vdttin 5«nwmiit of fw fwtflte. 
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Addendum F 
vw/ ' vvf4vv?/*Ai v / j . u r«i cxiw .^a BOCK r e a l t y *AA flu. <\w or t^ ;j/,«i<: 
SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THfSSBJLERFlNANCWGADDW^ 
Offer Rrtxvw Pate of January 6th, 2(107 . t»tw**n Scott & T|ffony Wifann 
***fW>™*r^flflglftKJphngQn,, \ . t _ asSeller, rraarxfiog 
119 Property locate at, 7 0 4 8 AlSf A.SA7) Olmte Washinpfrm I /T 84f7flft T*« toi^nnhi* ADDENDUM 
are hereby trctftporsted ee part of the REPC. 
L CREDIT D0CUMBMT5. Mhfc extension of oredft to Buy®- shall he evidenced by* [fcj Mote and £>e*d of Trust 
t INafa^dAfMndudY8DeedofTrustJ JOttec.^, i_,. 
2. CFlHttTTEKMS. ThMerrosofthewgditfooumentsni^ 
jSSQiPf lQ-M . principal amount'of the note (the "Note'); tatar**{ atfl.9 % per annum; payable aiapprcadmately 
l 6 2 5 y J E L — p ^ O l Q I i m > T** «nt!rs unpaid btiAnod of pdnclptf ptus accrued interest fe due In 3 a Q _ month© 
fromdgte of the Note, First payment due M q y J fit 2nf)7 Additional principal payments, bafloon payments or other 
torroe oe follows:. 
*+~ 
The crecffi documents refertwiced in 3ecion 1 of this ADDENDUM wlU contain • dyk-on-wto clause In fever gf Seller, Sailer 
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement' (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) q written disdosum of 
the total Interest Bayer will pay to maturity of the Nets; and (o) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on kmn dosing 
ooste. 
1 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shell also bo responsible 
fan (a) property taxes; <b) homeowners asaoctefion dues; (c) ipectel assessment*; and (d) hazard insurance premiums pn the 
Property. "Tbew obligations will be peAA: [ I directty to Setoff fectvw Agent on * monthly basis (XI directly io me 
applicable aounty treasurer, a wocurtton, and in*uranco con* p*ny as require4 by those entftws, 
4, PAYMENT* Buye^ p*Ymfnte under 8ectfons 2 and 3 abc** vvlU be made to: I ] goiter [XI an Escrow Agent If an 
e&orow Agent, T Q j ^ fay B U Y E R will act as Escrow Agsnt and wtll b<& responsible for disbursing payments 
on any undectylng mongage or deed of twet (the 'underlying mortgage*) and to the Seller. Cost of catting up the escrow account 
shall be paid try: [ 1 Buyer I 1 toiler [XI *pKt ovtnly between the parties 
$. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYNENT* Ahy payment not made within j 5 day$ after It Is due to subject to a late charga 
of * N f t or 5 _,, % of the installment due, whichever b gceater, Am^untfi in detatftt shall bear interest at a rata 
offi ._,_ .. <K per annum. All or pert of the principal balanoo on tho Note may bo paid prior to maturity without permtty, 
15. DUEOftSALfc- Aspidtfthe8«U*rDtado^ 
of tho undeHying mort^ afifo, thtp note secured (hereby, and the amorttattour achedufy Buyefa obr^a^on to purchase under thb 
Contmct fe condWoned upon B u y ^ approval of #w oontertl of thoae dgcumenta, Irt acoonjgnoe wtth 5eoHtm a of the RK'C. 
tf the hotdtr of the vnd^dyma mor^jega c*iis the loan due ©a a result of thfe ta^satflon, Buyer agiteea to diecharge the 
underlying tean &s reared by the mortgage tender, in auch event ^eOQ^ rBmainihg oaatty shall be paid i r provided in the 
credit documents. 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provide tg Settor, as a reqafredpart of this ADDQ^DUM, the attached Buyer Financial 
tnfemiafiw Sheet wyer may use the Buyer Financial trtfocmaHpn Sheet approve^ by the Real Eetete Cemmii& o^h and the 
Attorney General's Ofltoa, or may provide comparable written Information in a dtfl^ortt format, together with such additional 
Information as Seller may reasonably requite Buyer M WILL [ ] WILL NOT provide Se«er wtth copies of IRe return* for the 
t#o preceding tax years. Buyer aoknowledgee ftiet sefler may oomad Buyer's current employer W verlficadon of ontploymant 
as represented by Buyer m the Buyer Financial Informotion fiheet 
3, SELLER APPROVAL By the Salter Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24$) of the R£PC, Buyer «ha(( provide to 
6eUer, et Buyer's expense, e current credK report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use me on&dit 
Page i of I pa$es S e l l e r initial^ rc»_._ Buyer'f i n t t i a b Q ^ v Caf»_^WZL/ 
4A»/ vo/£uui/NU \irAi m &XK *ed Kodc Realty FAX Ho, 435 ^74 92k t, UlU 
report and the Information referenced ta Secfion 7 of thle Addendum ClBuy%r Ofectyurert to evaluate the t^tfit^tforthlrms of 
Buyer, 
M Seller Review, Sy the B/aiuetk>he& I n s p e c t 
(he credit report mtd ih« Buyer Diaeto*uiteB to determine tf tha content of the sjedlr report and the Buyer Dteckfcurea. it 
stooepteWe, f f t h e c o n ^ of the otxfttvpcrtortrw Buyer D I ^ 
( a ) p w ^ v ^ n o b j e c ! f o n « f o 
providing written rwtfce to Buyer tjy the Evehiritafa & Inspection* Deadline rafe^nced h Sedlon 24<c$ of the REPC, The 
&roterage< upon reoe|rf of a oapy of Setters written notfoe of canoeflettort, tfiedl return to Buyer f ie Earnest Money Dcpoerl 
8.2 Seller Objectione. If Seller dtfes hot rnirotdlately cancel the TK^PC as presided above, Setter may, by the Evaluations 
4 Inspections Deadline referenced in Section Z4{e) of the REPC, provide Buyar wft^  written objection* 9(jyer end Seller ehalt 
b«v^ eeven calendar days after Buyer's n»dpt of the obfeotjona (the Tteepon&e P*4odv) m wnfch to ©gnse la writing upon the 
manner of resolving Senate o^ectians. Buyer may, twit shall not be required to, reaihfe Soto's ofafeatona. If Seller and Buyer 
have not agreed hi vwtfng upon the manner of resolving Seller1* objector?* Belter rhay caneel the REPC by ptovidtag written 
noficoto Buyer no later th&nthta* calendar <feys after expiration of tfca Reispons© P#diod The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy 
of Setter's written notice of cactceftitton, steB return to euyfcr th« Earnest Money Deposit 
6.3 Failure to Object If Seller does net deliver a written objection to Bu^er regardaig the credit report of a Buyer 
Disclosure toy the B/aluaforTS&lnsp^^ 
in Sections 8.1 or Q^ of this ADDENDUM, the credit report end &/yer Ofedoeurw WSt be deemed approved by Seller, 
9, TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [fc| SHALL I J SHALL HOT provide to Seler a l e n ^ e policy of title insurance in the amgunt 
of the tndebtednnee to the Seller, oitd shall pay for suofi pottoy «t Settlement 
10. DISCLOSURE? OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER* By no later than Segment, Buyer and Seller shall disoJoee to 
•ach other thefrreepediveSodal Security Numbgre or other appfo^We tax Mentifcrtlon numbers so that frey may wmpty whh 
federal tews on reporting mortgage 'vtorrert In filings with the Internal Revenue Service, 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPD, Including all pnof addtftda and 
counteroffers, these terms shatl oohtrol, AH ofherteema of the REPC, Including ell prtpr addenda and counteroffers, not modified 
by this ADDENDUM shiH remain the eame, [XI Seller ( J Buyar*nall have unhl 6 * 0 0 t 1 AM [XI PM Mountain 
Time an JfJFHlfl^ &f 2 0 0 7 . (Date?, to accept the terms of this SELLER FINtANCING ADDENDUM in eooordance with 
Sedjjifl 2 3 / f tfw REPC, Unless 60 accepte d, t ie offer as eoc forth in flils SELLER] FINANCING ADDENDUM shall kp*s. 
^JL>—, 1M7 J\ >&L jJuyWl*'] Settw Sfgn««rg , — ' (Daty (Time) V social Security Number 
[}Q BUyer M Belter^gnatOW (Date) ( T « T K > ) P Social Security Number 
ACOerrANCE/OOUNTEROFPER/REJECTlON 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE { 1 Setter I 1 Buyer hereby accepts the*? terms, 
\ COUMTfiHOFFHt t 1 S»Her ( ] Buy^r1 presents as « counteroffer the tetjme set forth on the aftodied ADDENDUM 
NO.., J L 
Siynature) ~ " (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ 1 REJECTION:! l ee t l er l 1 Buyer rojocte the feregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM. 
(Sianature) (D«t») (Time) (Sgrdlore) P ^ ) (""^J 
ThlS ro«MAPWO^BrTWUrWPE^eTATecof*#^ONAl«THeOH^WTHEOT^ 
eFFR^NRAUQWST17,1»88. rr»<S»UC6S AN080P««HDESiUjLPPB^U3LY^ROViaVpl8TO<«OFT»tePC«^ 
P«fle 2 of 2 pages S^ter1* initiate Pafa Buy*^ mfo^&^l - OBte^2^2-7 
Addendum G 
Michael F Leavitt (9476) 
DURHAM JONES & PINECAR 
192 East 200 North, Thiid Flooi 
St George, Utah 84770 
Phone. (435)674-0400 
Fax:(435)628-1610 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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-w 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STkTE OF UTAH 
SCOT T WILSON, an individual, and 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual, 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CkseNo 070500581 
Judge James L Shumate 
The Court held a hearing on cross-motions for partial surrjmary judgment in the above-
captioned mattei on Octobei 11,2007 Plaintiffs were representee by Michael Leavitt of the law 
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegai Defendant was represented by Nathan Dorius of the law firm 
of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deeie The Court reviewed the mlemoranda submitted by the 
parties and heaid argument 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT 
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is 
no dispute as tc the foVwing material facts-
SIG_2804I 1 ] 
bout December 1, 2006, 
L Defendant, Angela Johnson, ('"Defendant") is t^ ie owner of property located at 
704 Soxith Anasazi Ciicle, Washington, Utah - the property at issue in this case ("Residence"). 
2. Defendant listed the Residence for sale on or at 
adveitising the fact that she was willing to seller -finance the transaction at 4.9% per annum 
3. On or about January 6,2007, Plaintiffs, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson 
("Plaintiffs") offered to puichase the Residence from Defendant, offering to pay $1,100,000 with 
Plaintiff paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of $ 110,000 down 
and Defendant seller-financing $990,000.. 
4. The Plaintiffs' offer was made on a standard R^al Estate Purchase Contract form 
approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. 
5. The initial offer specified that the purchase pricb would be paid through seller 
financing and contained the following language: 
Theie [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing 
additional terms. If there ate, the teims of the following addenda 
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum 
No 1 [X] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/yA Loan 
Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] LeadfBased Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this 
disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Pa^nt Addendum (in 
some transactions this addendum is required by l^w) [X] Other 
(specify) Notice of'Interest Addendum. 
6.. Along with the initial offer, and to specify the t^rms of the seller financing, the 
Plaintiffs included a seller financing addendum ("Seller Financing Addendum") that specified 
that Defendant would provide seller financing for the Residence in the principal amount of 
$990,000.00 at 4 9% per annum for 360 months, with the first payment to begin May 1, 2007 
STG 28041 1 2 
7 On 01 about January 8, 2007, Defendant executbd a counter offer, listed as 
Addendum No 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000 00 foi the purchase of the Residence and 
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house on th^ market" 
8_ Addendum No, 2 specifically states: 
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict 
with any provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and 
counteroffers, these terms shall control All other terms of the 
REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified 
by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. 
9 Defendant's counteroffer made no mention of the Seller Financing Addendum, 
and made no changes to any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 7 
above. 
10 On that same date, the Plaintiffs executed Addendum No 3, counter-offering the 
following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (b) in lieu of 72 hop: clause, settlement to be 2-23-
07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released to seller on 2-10-07; and (d) 
all other terms and conditions to remain the same 
11 On the same date, Defendant signed both the REPC and Addendum No. 3, but 
did not sign the Seller Financing Addendum 
12. In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from Plaintiffs' initial offer to the 
final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or the Seller Financing 
Addendum, which stated that Defendant would finance $990,000 |as the seller and that Plaintiffs 
would pay a total of $ 110,000 as a down payment 
13 The parties agreed to close on the sale of the Residence by February 23, 2007 
S7G 28041 1 3 
14 On 01 about February 10, 2007, Defendant received the $20,000 earnest money 
deposit check and negotiated it 
15 Plaintiffs closed their end of the transaction onlFebruary 23, 2007 by signing, 
among other documents, an All-inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $1,035,000 00 and 
bringing $98,625 42 to the closing officer 
16~ At closing on February 23, 2007, Defendant did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement because she did not agree with the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum 
17 The transaction did not close on February 23, 2007 
18 Plaintiffs caused a Notice of Interest to be recorded against the Property after the 
transaction did not close 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the tollowing conclusions of 
law: 
L A justiciable controversy and actual conflict exists between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant with respect to whether Defendant is bound by the te^ms of the Seller Financing 
Addendum, specifically whether she agreed to finance the purchase of the Residence at 4 9% per 
annum 
2 Plaintiffs and Defendant are adverse to each otheij with respect to this controversy 
and conflict 
3 Plaintiffs and Defendant each have an interest to protect with respect to this issue 
4 The issue \s ripe foi judicial review 
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5 As a result of Defendant's signature to Addendurh No 3, her acceptance of 
Addendum No 3, and hei transmission of hei acceptance of Addendum No 3 to Plaintiffs, 
Defendant agieed to the terms of the REPC and all addenda and counteroffers that weie not 
changed by the terms of Addendum No 3 
6 These enforceable terms include the fact that Defendant agieed to seller-finance 
the transaction at 4 9% pei annum, as reflected in the Sellei Financing Addendum 
7, Plaintiffs and Defendant were bound by the terms of the REPC, Seller Financing 
Addendum, and Addendum No 3 
8 Plaintiffs were not in breach of the REPC, Sellei Financing Addendum, oi 
Addendum No 3, and pei formed in accordance with those documents 
9 The Notice of Interest that Plaintiffs caused to be recorded against the Property 
was authorized by Utah Code Ann 57-9-4, and therefore, is not ajwrongful lien as stated in Utah 
Code Ann Title 38, Chapter 9 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs' Motion 
fox Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is DENIED 
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DATED this k day of 2008 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH 
JUDGE 
District Court 
L SHUMATI 
Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Bennett lueller Johnson & Deere 
£an A Monsoi 
/Natha^S Doiius 
Attorneys foi Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC 3 
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing Orjder Gr anting Partial 
Summary Judgment was ser/ed this \p day of T N P H \ 2y08, via US.. Mai], postage 
prepaid upon the following: 
Sean A- Monson 
Nathan S. Doiius 
BENNETT, TUEIIER, JOHNSON & DEERE 
3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City>UT 84121 
egal Assistant 
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Addendum H 
^ i.S^GTO.4 COUNT-' 
Michael F. Leavitt (9476) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St George, Utah 84770 
Phone: (435) 674-0400 
Fax: (435) 628-1610 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
41483.04 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT qOURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual, 
Defendant. 
,oU FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Cas<i No. 070500581 
Judge fames L. Shumate 
The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-
captioned matter on May 11, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Michael Leavitt of the law 
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. Defendant was represented by Sean Monson of the law 
firFL of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deere The Court reviewed the Memoranda submitted by 
tie parties and heard argument. 
ZTC, ^ 56762 l 
FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACJT 
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is 
no genuine dispute of the following material facts: 
L This Court has previously determined that the Rea[l Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC") signed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, "Parties") on or about January 8, 
2007, including all addenda and counteroffers, not changed by the Serins of a document entitled 
Addendum No. 3, was a binding agreement between the Parties. 
2. According to the REPC, the parties agreed to close|the transaction on February 
23, 2007. 
3. On February 23,2007, the Wilsons closed their end of the transaction, signed all 
documents, and deposited the appropriate funds with the title company. 
4. On the same date, Defendant went to the title company and signed most of the 
closing documents, but refused to sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement that was necessary to 
close the transaction, and therefore, the transaction did not close. 
5. The REPC specifically states that in the event the sejller defaults, in addition to 
return of the earnest money deposit, buyer may elect either to accept jfrom seller a sum equal to 
the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue seller tc| specifically enforce the 
contract to, or pursue other remedies available at law. 
6* The REPC also grants the prevailing party, in the eve^t of litigation or binding 
arbitration to enforce the REPC, an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
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7. Plaintiffs were the buyers in the REPC and paid an earnest money deposit of 
$20,000, which has been retained by Defendant, the seller identified in the REPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes tt(e following conclusions of 
law: 
1. To prove breach of contract, a complaining party mtist show: (1) the existence of 
a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the Plaintiff; (3) breach of express 
performance by the defendant; and (4) damages to the PlaiiAtiff resulting from the breach. See 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrooke & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f32> 70 P3d 17. 
2. In the instant case, the REPC is a valid and enforceable agreement. 
3. Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations stated in the REPC. 
4. Defendant failed to perform her obligations in the REPC by failing to sign all 
documents necessary to effectuate closing on the date agreed by the parties. 
5. Plaintiffs were damaged by Defendant's failure to perform. 
6. Plaintiffs have elected their remedy for compensatory damages by seeking a 
return of their earnest money deposit of $20,000, and an amount equ^l to that of $20,000, for 
total compensatory damages of $40,000. 
7. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action, and therefore, are entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs have 
judgment against Defendant Angela Johnson in the amount of $4(^ ,000, plus interest at the post-
judgment rate of 5.42% per annum until paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are awarded 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined! by affidavit of counsel for 
Plaintiffs, and that this judgment may be augmented to include additional reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs necessarily expended in the execution of this judgment 
DATED this 1 / day of zj ft ^1 2009. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE JAMESlL. SI 
District Court Jipge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing OR)DER AND JUDGMENT was 
served this ^ a v of d a n . 2009, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid upon the following: 
Sean A. Monson 
Nathan S. Dorius 
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE 
3165 E. Miilrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Legal Assista: 
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